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1Abstract
This paper examines the role of long term debt for the political support
of a monetary union or, more generally, an inﬂation-reduction policy. The
central idea is that the decision about membership in the union leads to a
redistribution between debtors and creditors, if they are holding long term
debt with a nominally xed interest rate, as well as tax payers. For example, if
joining the union means a decrease in the inﬂation rate, creditors should favor
joining while debtors should be against it. A government of a high inﬂation
country might strategically try to exploit this eect by selling more long term
debt denominated in its own currency at a xed nominal rate rather than a
foreign currency such as the Dollar (or, almost equivalently, as ﬂoating-rate
debt or rolled-over short-term debt) to its citizens. We show that the eect on
politicalsupport is unclear. Whilethe \creditoreect" of increasing the number
of agents holding domestically denominated debt helps generating support for
joining the union, the \tax eect" of having to raise more taxes in order to pay
for the increased real debt payments after a successful monetary union works
in the opposite way. The paper then studies a number of special cases and
ramications. The case of Italy is examined more closely. The paper argues
that recent debt management policy in Italy is probable to have eroded the
political support for actions aimed at enhancing EMU membership chances.1 Introduction
The date for a European monetary union appears to come closer. Satisfying the
criteria set forth by the Maastricht treaty for becoming a member of the union plays
an increasingly important role in the public debates in many countries. Whether
or not individual countries will adopt certain measures to increase their chances at
becoming members such as lowering the budget decit will depend on the strength
of the popular support for such actions.
This paper examines the role of long term debt management for generating such
popular support. More precisely, we analyze how the split of a given amount of long
term debt into domestically denominated debt and foreign denominated debt inﬂu-
ences voter preferences. The paper applies in particular to the situation of monetary
union in Europe, but also more broadly to any situation, in which a government seeks
political support for possibly painful measures which may result in a lower inﬂation
rate.
The central idea is that the decision about membership in the union leads to a
redistribution between debtors and creditors, if they are holding long term debt with
a nominally xed interest rate, as well as tax payers. For example, if joining the union
means a decrease in the inﬂation rate, creditors should favor joining while debtors
should be against it. A government of a high inﬂation country might strategically try
to exploit this eect by denominate more of its long term debt in its domestic currency
at a xed nominal rate rather than a foreign currency such as the Dollar (or, almost
equivalently, as ﬂoating-rate debt or rolled-over short-term debt). We show that
the eect on political support is unclear. While the \creditor eect" of increasing the
number of agents experiencing a potential windfall gain helps in generating support for
joining the union, the \tax eect" of having to raise more taxes in order to pay for the
increasedreal debtrepaymentsafter a successful monetary union works in the opposite
way. The paper then studies a number of special cases and ramications. In the
conclusion, this author voices the opinion, that issuing long term debt denominated
in the domestic currency is a bad idea, if one seeks political support for membership
enhancing actions.
While much has been written about the European exchange rate system and the
eect of the Maastricht treaty on the conduct on monetary and scal policy in Eu-
rope, see e.g. Giavazzi (1988), CEPR (1991), Kenen (1995) or Giovannini (1996),
or monetary policy in general, see e.g. the book treatment by Cukierman (1992),
the collections of papers in Persson and Tabellini (1994a,b), or the survey by Eijn-
ger and de Haan (1996), little attention seems to have been paid so far to the issue
of redistribution between creditors, debtors and tax payers, which is central to the
analysis in this paper. The most closely related literature may be the literature on
using debt policy to commit to a particular monetary or other governmental pol-
icy, starting with Stokey and Lucas (1983), also reprinted in Persson and Tabellini
(1994a), volume 1, as well as Aghion and Bolton (1990) and Milesi-Ferretti (1995a).
The closest of these may be the paper by Milesi-Ferretti, who analyzes how a govern-
1ment can inﬂuence its reelection probabilities through the choice of issuing indexed
versus non-indexed debt, provided dierent parties have dierent attitudes towards
inﬂation1. The key insight in that paper is that an incumbant who is generally more
positively inclined towards inﬂation than the median voter may issue more indexed
debt as this will force the next government in power to be more careful about inﬂa-
tion than with nonindexed debt: this will tie the incumbants hands upon the next
election, and make him look relatively more attractive to the median voter. Milesi-
Ferretti focusses on a very dierent issue than we do, however. Furthermore, the
redistributions between voters, which are key to our analysis, only play a rather indi-
rect role in Milesi-Ferrettis paper. Debt management in light of credibility has been
investigated in Missale and Blanchard (1994) and De Fontenay, Milesi-Ferretti and
Pill (1995). There has also been a lot of work on the relationship between monetary
policy or inﬂation and the issuance of foreign debt such as Bohn (1990, 1991) and,
more recently, G erard and Gilson (1996), or more generally on the issues of debt,
central bank strategy and monetary union, see Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini
(1992) or Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995, 1996). It thus seems that the issue raised
in this paper has not yet been addressed before.
This seems odd. Take the case of Italy, for example. While we postpone a more
detailed look to section 13, some rough numbers taken from that section may indicate
the magnitude of this issue. The public sector debt amounted in 1994 to 125% of
GDP (see OECD, 1996), with 54% of this debt in form of medium and long-term
securities. About half of that debt is in form of xed coupon Lira-denominated debt
with an average maturity of around 5 years. The nominal interest rate dierential
vis- a-vis Germany has been around 4 percent or more until the beginning of 1996 (for
a detailed discussion of that dierential, see Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa, 1996).
After a monetary union, and if Italy becomes a member, this interest rate dierential
would presumably almost disappear. If long term nominal interest rate dierentials
are driven mainly by dierences in inﬂationary expectations, and if the inﬂation in
a monetary union resembles more the current inﬂation in Germany than in Italy,
nominal long term interest rates in Italy would likely drop by, say, 4% after becoming
a union member, compared to the levels at the beginning of 1996. Thus, Italian debt
holders will experience a windfall gain amounting to more than 1% of GDP on an
annual basis until maturity of the debt issued at or before the beginning of 1996.
In fact, some of that windfall has already materialized before the monetary union,
since the interest dierential vis- a-vis Germany has fallen dramatically, see gure 2
in section 13, and is at less than 2 percent at the beginning of 1997. Presumably, this
is due to a reassessment of Italys chances at membership by the nancial markets
since the beginning of 1996. This is certainly not a trivial amount. It does not seem
unlikely that voter preferences regarding measures aimed at increasing the chances of
becoming a member of the union may be inﬂuenced by such windfall gains. Indeed,
1He also uses a similar device to study strategic exchange rate management, see Milesi-Ferretti,
1995b.
2the average maturity of Italian debt has risen from 2.3 years in 1990 to around 5 years
early in 1996, which might have been a deliberate choice by the government in order
to increase popular support for such measures.
The paper focusses on the eect shifting the composition of public debt between
foreign denominated debt vis- a-vis home currency denominated debt on the political
support for a monetary union. A few remarks may be in order. There are other
reasons which lead countries to issue particular forms of debt: some of these other
reasons are discussed in the literature cited above. For example, countries such as
Germany rarely oer foreign-denominated debt perhaps for credibility reasons, and
it may feel itself quite restricted regarding the choices analyzed in this paper. Other
countries may simply nd it cheaper to issue foreign denominated debt. This paper
deliberately focusses only on one of the many issues involved here and provides a
possibly oversimplied analysis of a complex problem: all the other aspects remain
and need to be \added on" to the considerations in this paper before reaching any
judgement in practice. Some countries such as the United Kingdom, Belgium and
Italy oer debt with ﬂoating rates rather than xed rates. This can be understood
within the analysis oered here, since ﬂoating rate debt essentially insulates against
inﬂation shocks and can thus be used synonymously with foreign denominated debt
throughout the paper. An interesting dimension may be the choice of maturity rather
than the type of long-term debt: would it be better for countries to oer short-term
debt rather than long-term debt in light of the issues described in this paper? But
note that, essentially, rolled-over short term debt is nothing but long term debt at
ﬂoating rates and thus essentially the same as long term debt denominated in a
foreign currency as studied here. The analysis becomes quite a bit less elegant when
formulated directly in this manner, but it does not change substantially. In light of
this, the analysis here pertains to a fairly large and relevant class of debt management
choices.
The paper is organized as follows. As a \warm-up" exercise, we consider the case
of purely private debt in section 2. The main model is then introduced in section
3. The aim here was to construct a particularly simple model with debt, inﬂation,
two periods and a simple \yes" or \no" vote on taking a particular action and we
defend our model structure a bit more in section 5, extending it in particular with an
additional government election stage at date zero. Despite its simplicity, the model
delivers a rich set of scenarios and implications, as will be shown in the following
sections. Section 4 provides a rst analysis and some calculations. In particular,
it is shown that there is always a unique equilibrium, given the portfolio decisions
of the agents and the government. This is an interesting result all by itself due
to the interdependence between the actions actually taken in equilibrium and the
action preferred by the voters. To generate precise predictions, however, one needs
to specify further assumptions which tie down the distribution of debt holdings and
tax liabilities in the population. The next sections study several scenarios, oering a
smorgasboard of possibilities. Section 6 provides a guide to these dierent scenarios,
studied in detail in sections 7 through 12. Section 13 discusses the Italian case, using
3facts about its current debt structure. Finally, section 14 concludes.
2 Private debt.
As a \warm-up" exercise for the next sections, we rst consider the inﬂuence of
private long-term debt, ignoring all other factors inﬂuencing the popular support for
or against a monetary union. Thus, suppose there is a large population of agents,
who engage in borrowing and lending, using long-term debt contracts with nominally
xed interest rates. Such long-term contracts are common in the nancing of real
estate such as private homes, for example. We suppose that these agents belong
to high-inﬂation country, so that becoming a member means a fall in the average
inﬂation rate and thus a rise in the real return on these debt contracts. Suppose the
government can undertake some action which will increase the chances of the country
to participate in the monetary union, but will only undertake it, if a majority of the
population supports that action. We can think of that action as corresponding to a
\last-minute" reduction in the budget decit or the current inﬂation rate. What we
are trying to capture with this increase in the chances of becoming a member is the
fact, that the nal membership decision is a highly politicized event, and that the
Maastricht criteria will only provide a guide. Countries which really want to become
a member may accomplish this by showing good citizenship or by taking some last-
minute desperate measures aimed at pleasing the more skeptical among the other
countries, who ultimately have to render judgement on the issue of membership.
These last-minute actions may possibly have some adverse short-term eects on
the economy. On the other hand, joining the union may generate some long-term
benets to individual agents, too, like possibly improved conditions for international
trade with other member countries due to using a common currency. Both, the short-
run costs and the long-run benets would surely enter the consideration of voters in
deciding whether to support or to oppose the action, which the government could
take to enhance the chances of becoming a member of the union. For simplicity, we
completelyabstract from these tradeos in this section of the analysis, and focus solely
on the issue of redistribution between creditors and debtors. We will reintroduce these
costs and benets in the next section.
Here, we thus simply suppose that net creditors will favor the action to be taken
while net debtors will oppose it. What will happen? The answer is simple. Let p
be the fraction of agents who are net creditors and consequently, let 1 − p be the
fraction of agents who are net borrowers2.I fp>1 = 2, the action will be supported
by a majority, whereas it will be opposed by a majority, if p<1 = 2. In other words, if
lots of agents borrow relatively small amounts each from a few deep-pocket lenders,
a monetary union is less likely to be supported, whereas with many small-time savers
2This ignores agents who are neither, i.e. who have a net asset position of zero. To deal with
these agents, we may either assume that their mass is negligible or that they will simply abstain
from a vote about the action, since they would be indierent.
4lending to a few real estate tycoons, say, a government which works towards union
membership will have popular support. This extremely simple analysis shows, that
the distribution of debt and credit in the population is critical for the outcome.
3 Public debt.
We now investigate the issue of public rather than private debt. Our aim is to study
the question, to what extent debt management can be used to tilt the popular support
for or against a membership-chance enhancing action. More specically, we allow the
government to issue nominal debt, denominated in the home currency, where the
ex post real return will be aected by whether the country becomes a member of
the monetary union or not, and nominal debt denominated in some stable foreign
currency, which is unaected by the question of monetary union. Equivalently, we
could assume that the government can issue debt denominated in real terms such as
indexed debt.
We assume that there are I agents i =1 ;:::;I, which dier in how much they
want to save, si at some early date as well as how much income yi they receive at a
later date. We allow savings to be negative, i.e. for agents to be indebted, as well as
for incomes to be negative. Furthermore, agents dier in how much they benet from
joining a monetary union and how much they are hurt by the membership enhancing
action by the government. We express these \other benets" from joining in form
of a \consumption good equivalent" zi, which can be positive or negative, and we
express the harm from taking the action by γi, which one might want to envision to
be nonnegative, but again doesn't have to. There may be many additional eects
one may think of, which are all summarized by this parameter γi. For example,
it can reﬂect better economic performance of the country upon joining because of
greater scal discipline or greater trading possibilities All three variables si, yi and
zi are real quantities and are taken as primitive parameters of the model. There is a
government, which, among other things, will collect income taxes in order to repay its
debt. We assume that the total income tax paid on income yi is given by  (yi)f o r
some a priori xed tax schedule  () and some to-be-determined tax factor ,w h i c h
depends on aggregate circumstances, as we shall see. Thus, total tax collection by





is the \normalized" total tax, which would be collected, if the tax factor  was set to
unity. Introducing this symbol   helps us to economize on notation below. We note,
that we have made no restrictions about the sign of (yi). In other words, we allow
not only for tax payers, but also for transfer receivers.
In case of joining the monetary union, the inﬂation rate in the country will be
(normalized at) zero, but it will be >0, in case the country does not join. We
5take  to be a primitive parameter of the model. It is chosen to be positive through-
out in the analysis, because we have countries with above-average inﬂation in mind.
However, the entire analysis applies equally well to the case <0: all the eects
are simply exactly reversed. This case may well apply to, say, Germany as well as
the Netherlands, see Zettelmayer, 1996. Finally, the case  = 0 makes the analysis
of this paper empty. As for monetary union in Europe, one should note here, that
the home currency will continue to exist side by side to the Euro for the years 1999
to 2002. What matters, however, is the fact, that the exchange rates will be frozen:
if a country joins the monetary union, its inﬂation rate will be that of the union, no
matter which currency is used from then on. A more problematic issue from the per-
spective of this analysis is the fact that there may be some last-minute exchange rate
adjustment just before freezing them forever. However, it is unlikely, that these ex-
change rate adjustments will fully be able to completely undo the union-membership
decision risk inherent in domestically denominated debt. Finally, while the assump-
tion of zero inﬂation in the union simplies our analysis, the union inﬂation rate itself
may depend on which countries will ultimately join. In that case, one should read 
as the inﬂation dierential for joining versus not joining for the country at hand, and
one would then need to endogenize  as well. We refrain from doing so as this would
otherwise further complicate the analysis.
The government will be given a choice to issue its debt denominated in the home
currency at some market-determined nominal return ~ R or denominated in some for-
eign currencyat some xed real return Rf. What we have in mind for foreign-currency
denominated bonds is that there is a world market return for bonds issued in that
currency determined outside this model. To calculate the ex post real return Rd on
the debt denominated in the domestic currency, one needs to subtract the realized
inﬂation rate. I.e., the ex post real return Rd will be ~ R if monetary union happens
and ~ R −  if monetary union does not happen.
We assume the following sequence of events:






splitting it into nominal debt bd denoted in the domestic currency and nominal
debt bf denoted in a foreign currency,
b = bd + bf;
Let  = bd=b denote the fraction of debt which was issued in the domestic
currency, and assume, that this fraction is not degenerate, i.e. that 0 <<1.
3One can interpret our assumption about b =
P
i si as a denition about b to be that part of
the debt of a country which it sells to domestic savers as well as si to be that part of the savings
of private agents, which they use to buy government debt, ignoring all other credit markets. In
particular, we ignore sales of assets to foreigners for now. We get back to this in section 11.










showing the market clearing conditions for bonds of each individual type, where
(si;d;s i;f) is the portfolio in the two types of government bonds of saver i: si =
si;d + si;f.
2. The voting date: The government can take some action which will enhance
the chances of the country to become a member of the monetary union. It will
take the action (a = 1), if it is supported by a strict majority4 of the population,
otherwise it doesn't (a = 0). For notation, let p = p1 denote the probability of
membership, if the action is taken, and p = p0 <p 1denote the probability of
membership, if the action is not taken.
3. The realization date: The country becomes a member with probability pa
and stays out of the union otherwise.
4. The repayment date: Taking the tax schedule  (y)a sg i v e n ,t h eg o v e r n m e n t
retires the debt by calculating the tax factor  so that
  = Rdbd + Rfbf
We assume that the utility of an agent who has a portfolio (si;d;s i;f)a n di n c o m e
y iis given by the total consumption
ui = E [ci] − γi1fa=1g
where the consumption is given by
ci =
(
ci;m = ~ Rsi;d + Rfsi;f + yi − m (yi)+z i; if membership
ci;n =(~ R− ) s i;d + Rfsi;f + yi − n (yi); if no membership
and where 1fa=1g is an indicator function for whether the action has been taken or
not.
The agent is assumed to choose the partition of his portfolio (si;d;s i;f)s oa st o
maximize utility ui. He rationally foresees the outcome of the decision about the ac-
tion at the voting date. Hence, the expected real return on domestically denominated
debt must equal the real return on debt denominated in the foreign currency,
Rf = p ~ R +( 1−p a)(~ R−);
4There is nothing special about choosing the strict majority rule in this paper. One might equally
well do the entire analysis requiring, say, some given fraction  of the agents supporting the action
to enact it.
7or
~ R = Rf +( 1−p a)  (1)
where pa = p1 or pa = p0, depending on whether the governmenttakes the membership-
encouraging action (a =1 )o rn o t( a= 0) in equilibrium. Equation (1) suggests that
one can interpret changes the interest dierential between, say, Italian bonds vis- a-vis
German bonds, as either due to changes in market expectations about Italys future
inﬂation rate , in case it does not join the European monetary union, or as due to
changes in market judgements regarding the probability of Italy joining the union: for
this paper, we concentrate on the latter. In interpreting such interest dierential, one
needs to be careful about the dierential tax treatment of interest payments across
countries as discussed in detail in Eijnger, Huizinga and Lemmen (1996), and about
default risk as discussed by Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1996). However, these
issues are tangential to the analysis here.
We have assumed that agents are risk neutral throughout most of the paper to
keep the analysis simple. It turns out that risk neutrality delivers more than just
simplicity: it actually deliversexistence of an equilibriumeasily, see section 4, whereas
risk aversion requires additional careful thought, see section 12.
In forming an opinion about whether to support or to oppose the action by the
government to increase the chances of membership, each agent evaluates his utility,
i.e. his expected consumption, given that a particular action is taken and given the
xed nominal return on domestically denominated bonds. I.e., the agent supports
t h ea c t i o nt ob et a k e n ,i f
u i; ~ R;1 = E
h
cijaction taken, ~ R
i
− γi >u i; ~ R;0 = E
h
cijaction not taken, ~ R
i
:
Note that since the choices here are particularly simple, and since there are no strate-
gic considerations, agents vote \sincerely" by simply voting their preferences. An
agent would not want to change his vote, even when conditioning on being pivotal.
An equilibrium is a nominal return ~ R, a split of individual portfolios (si;d;s i;f)
I
i=1
and the choice of whether to take the action (a =1 )o rn o t( a=0 )s ot h a t ,
1. Given a or, equivalently, the participation probability pa, as well as the nominal
return ~ R, each agent i maximizes his utility ui at the portfolio choice (si;d;s i;f).
2. Given the portfolio choices (si;d;s i;f) and the nominal return ~ R,am a j o r i t yo f
agents favors the governments decision a; whether or not to take the action
(with the majority being strict, if a =1 ) .
The rst equilibrium condition implies the no arbitrage condition (1) and essen-
tially not much else. Note that there is an inherent xed point problem here: given
a,c a l c u l a t e ~ Rwith (1) and given ~ R, nd a from the second equilibrium condition.
84 Existence of an equilibrium.
It is useful to do some general calculations which will help in the further analysis.
To talk about actions o the equilibriumpath, it proves to be convenient to attach
a subscript a referring to the equilibrium action to the nominal return in equation
(1),
~ Ra = Rf +( 1−p a):
With ~ Ra, one can calculate the ex post real return on domestically denominated
bonds and thus the tax factor . It is simply given by
x =

( ~ Ra − 1fx=ng)+ Rf (1 − )
 b
 
where x 2f m;ng is a subscript and where 1fx=mg is an indicator function for whether
(x = m)o rn o t( x=n ) monetary union takes place. The tax factor is a random vari-





regardless of whether the action is undertaken or not. Likewise, the expected return
on savings is given by Rf along the equilibrium path. When agents form an opinion,
however, whether or not they should favor the action to be taken, they are considering
\unexpected" deviations, taking the nominal return ~ R as given. Given a nominal
return ~ R = ~ Ra for the on-the-equilibrium-path decision a, the expected utility ui; ~ Ra;^ a
for agent i from proceeding with decision ^ a about the action is5
ui; ~ Ra;^ a =( p ^ a − p a ) 
 












+ p^ azi − γi1f^ a=1g
Thus, the dierence
i = ui; ~ Ra;1 − ui; ~ Ra;0
in utility terms between proceeding with the action (^ a = 1) rather than without it
(^ a = 0), given the on-the-equilibrium-path decision a,i sg i v e nb y












In particular, we see that the preference of the agent for or against taking the action
is independent of the realized choice on the equilibrium path and independent of the
5To derive this, use p^ a (1 − pa) − (1 − p^ a)pa = p^ a − pa.
9return Rf on foreign bonds. This \breaks" the xed point circle which is inherent
in the denition of the equilibrium, and thus allows us to prove existence of an
equilibrium, see the theorem below. Risk neutrality is crucial here: without it, the
i s s u ec a nb e c o m eq u i t eab i tm o r et r i c k y ,s e es e c t i o n1 2 .
We further note, that every agent is indierent between any possible portfo-
lio choice by virtue of our utility function. Thus, take any portfolio distribution
(si;d;s i;f)
I
i=1 across agents. With equation (2), one can now uniquely determine the
fraction of agents in favor of the action, and thus determine, which action will be
taken on the equilibrium path. We formulate this insight in form of a theorem:
Theorem 1 Given any portfolio distribution (si;d;s i;f)
I
i=1 across agents and given the
fraction  of bonds denominated in the local currency, there is a unique equilibrium.
In that equilibrium, the action enhancing the chances of membership in the monetary
union will be taken, if i > 0 for a strict majority of the population, where i is
given by equation (2).
It is worth emphasizing once more, that the equilibrium is unique given the port-
folio distribution and given , but that this distribution is not pinned down at all by
the structure of the model.
5 Why would a government do what it is supposed
to do? A defense of the model.
Why would a government want to follow the voter sentiment in deciding whether or
not to take the action as we have assumed? And why would a government want to
strategically manipulate the debt structure to enhance the popular support for such
a measure? These are important questions regarding the interpretation of the model
at hand.
To start with the rst question of why a government should follow the public
opinion, one can tell a simple story. While governments usually do not take popular
votes on a single issue such as taking some particular membership-chances enhancing
action, they nonetheless seem to care quite a lot about opinion polls, reﬂecting how
voters feel about governmental policy choices. This makes sense: the chances at
reelection in real life democracies depend on a multitude of issues, and incumbants
choose wisely when accumulating good will at each decision they have to make.
A similar reasoning applies to the rst question. The government in power in
this paper can be thought of as having been elected for a multitude of reasons, and
monetary unication is just one of them. The \ideal" government which follows the
majority opinion on every single issue often does not seem to be one of the choices
available in real life, and elections can turn into choosing between the lesser of two
evils. Thus, it is not illogical to assume that a government views the issue of monetary
unication dierently than the public does and hence wants to \manipulate" it into
10becoming more supportive of the governments view. Alternatively, the governments
views may precisely coincide with the public views ex ante: in that case, the analysis
of this paper can be seen as pointing out how a government can choose precisely the
right debt structure so that the incentives generated by the opinion poll are in line
with the original mandate of the government.
Admittedly, there is a tension here between the governments a voting public would
elect and the political manipulation of these same voters by the elected government.
The initial election of the government has not been modelled so far, since we do not
view it to be at the heart of the issue that we are interested in here. However, it is
remarkably easily done.
Imagine there is an additional government election date at date zero preceeding
all other dates, in which voters choose the government they prefer for the remainder
of the game. The election focusses on the single issue of the choice of .M o r e
precisely, voters choose the preferred value for  2 [0;1] by comparing them pairwise
with indierences decided by some tie-breaking rule (this is the usual framework
for the median voter theorem). The government is then committed to implement
the chosen value of , and the game proceeds further as above. Assume, that the
portfolio decisions of the agents are functions of , si;d = Si;d()a n ds i;f = S(i;f)().
With this, determine the unique implied decision about the action a = A()a sa
function of .L e t  0= f  j A (  )=0 gand 1 =  j A()=1 gbe the sets of all
 resulting in not taking the action respectively taking the action. Furthermore, let
i =( p 1−p 0) z i−γ ibe the expected other net benets from taking the action for agent
i. Assume nally that agents do not participate in a vote on a pairwise comparison of
two values of , if they are indierent, and otherwise vote for their preferred choice.
We get the following perhaps somewhat surprising result.
Theorem 2 With the additional stage 0 of choosing  by pairwise voting, a value
 2 0 will be chosen if the majority of the agents has negative net benets from
taking the action, i < 0,a n dav a l u e2 1will be chosen if the majority of the
agents has positive net benets from taking the action, i > 0. Within these sets, the
actual value of  chosen will be determined by the tie-breaking rule since all agents
are indierent between all values belonging to i, i =0 ;1 .
Proof: Calculating expected utility and exploiting the relationships derived in
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 i if a 2 A1; b 2A 0
− i if a 2 A0; b 2A 1
0 else.
11Figure 1: Insert gure 1 approximately here.
This delivers the theorem. 
What drives the result is that the ex-ante real return on savings is xed by the
world return Rf, regardless of the split into domesticallydenominated bonds or foreign
denominated bonds. Hence, the real tax burden is xed as well. It is only after agents
actually have split their portfolios, that the redistributional issues between savers and
tax payers start to matter for the political support for a monetary union.
In light of this theorem, we now feel comfortable progressing to the analysis of
the game described in section 3 above without the stage at date zero. In the analysis
below, further assumptions in particular about the portfolio functions Si;d()a n d
S i;f() will be made, deliveringpredictivebite. One can then read the results obtained
below as either an examination for the choices available to a possibly manipulative
government, or as the construction of the sets 0 and 1, which is of relevance for
the agents who need to choose between dierent  values at the voting stage of date
zero.
6 A guide to the scenarios.
The question that we are asking is this: can the government inﬂuence the degree of
support for the action by altering the choiceof the split into domesticallydenominated
versus foreign denominated debt, i.e. by changing ?A n di fs o ,h o w ?W en o wa i m
at answering this question in the following sections.
It should already be clear, that specic results are only to be obtained when
imposing further restrictions, and we shall do so below. The idea is to oer a range
of possibilities rather than x the conclusions with a particular choice of restrictive
assumptions beforehand. An overview of the particular scenarios studied here and
the results obtained can be glanced from gure 1.
The natural starting point is to rst abstract from other costs and benets of
a monetary union, i.e. to impose zi =0a n dγ i= 0 for all agents i. This will be
done in sections 7 to 9. Further restrictions are needed regarding the distribution of
savings and liabilities as well as regarding the portfolio decision of agents, since we
cannot pin down portfolio choices due to the otherwise convenient assumption of risk
neutrality. Section 7 considers the extreme case of bond holders versus tax payers,
whereas sections 8 and sections 9 apply more broadly. The dierence between these
two sections is the assumption regarding the portfolios: while the same portfolio split
(\perfect diversication") is assumed in section 8, agents are assumed not to diversify
at all in section 9.
Next, we reconsider the issue of other benets and burdens in a monetary union 10
12as described in the current setup of the model, before considering extensions. It is
fairly straightforward to allow for foreigners trading in debt as well: we study the
eects of this in sections 11 and 12. The latter section 12 also introduces risk-averse
as opposed to risk neutral utility functions, which oers the advantage of being able
to tie down the portfolio decisions endogenously. While one can get rather striking
results in case the country at hand is considered open and small with respect to
world risk, returning to the closed economy case shows, that the assumption of risk
neutrality above is more than just convenient: it actually ensures easily the existence
of an equilibrium, as demonstrated in proposition 1.
Let us proceed into the details of the analysis.
7 Bond holders versus tax payers, and zi  0;γ i0.
We rst study an extreme case, in which agents are either only savers or only tax
payers, and where the redistribution between bond holders and tax payers is the only
issue that matters for voting. One obviously gets the following result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that agents are either pure savers, i.e. si > 0 and  (yi)=0
or tax payers, si = si;d = si;f =0and  (yi) > 0. Assume that each saver holds
strictly positive amounts of debt denominated in the domestic currency. Let  be the
fraction of savers and 1 −  be the fraction of pure tax payers. Then, the action
enhancing the chance at union membership will be undertaken, if and only if >1 = 2 ,
regardless of . In particular, debt management has no eect on the popular support
for actions enhancing the chances at union membership.
Proof: Just check that indeed i > 0 for savers and i < 0 for pure tax payers.

One might want to give this result some interpretation. Evidence from the United
States suggests, that savings are highly skewed, with a large fraction of the population
holding very little savings and a small fraction holding a lot. On the other hand,
most citizens do have to pay taxes. This \arm-chair" evidence suggests, that in the
absence of any other motives, there should be an opposing majority to undertaking
eort towards becoming a member of a monetary union.
However, one might want to study this issue perhaps a bit more carefully, since
in particular, the distinction between those who save and those who pay taxes is in
practice unlikely to be as strict as assumed in the proposition above.
8 Perfect diversication and zi  0;γ i0.
We thus now consider situations, in which agents are both savers and tax payers
simultaneously. The model above admits many equilibria with respect to the portfolio
13choices of agents: taking the outcome of the vote at the voting date as given, agents
are completely indierent between any of the possible choices of splitting their savings
si between the various bonds. This is due to the assumed linear form of the utility
function and the no arbitrage condition (1). It thus may be natural to rst focus on
symmetric equilibria, in which agents fully diversify, i.e. in which each agents splits
his portfolio in exactly the same proportions as the government. Furthermore we
start by analyzing the case, in which the redistributional issue between debtors and
creditors is the only issue which matters to voters when forming their opinion about
the monetary union, i.e. we assume that zi  0. We obtain the following benchmark
indierence result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that all agents split their savings portfolio in the same way
between the two types of bonds, i.e. that si;d = si and si;f =( 1− )s i, and suppose
that agents do not have any other gains or losses from monetary union, i.e. zi =
0;i=1 ;:::;I. Then the fraction of agents supporting the action is independent of 
as well as . In other words, in this case, government debt policy as well as monetary
policy (in the sense of altering the non-membership inﬂation rate) are neutral with
respect to the popular support for the action, which enhances the chance at union
membership.
Proof: In that case,







The sign of i does not depend on  or .N o t et h a tw eh a v ea s s u m e df r o mt h es t a r t ,
that >0and >0 .
In light of the intuition given in the introduction, this theorem may be a bit
surprising. A shift into longer-term debt should make agents with higher savings
more appreciative of the monetary union because of the potential windfall gains from
redistribution towards creditors, whereas agents with higher income should be more
resistant to a monetary union as they have to pay for these windfalls with their taxes.
The proof shows, however, that no agent changes his attitude towards monetary
union, regardless of his savings or income level. Essentially, each agent calculates
his \net" gain from monetary union by comparing his gains from savings against his
losses from paying his share of the total additional taxes. Changing the composition
of the debt changes the scale of these individual net gains, but does not change their
signs. In some sense, with symmetric diversication, the intuition gained above from
the extreme case of tax payers versus savers still seems to go through.
149 No diversication and zi  0;γ i0.
As pointed out above, however, agents need not necessarily end up holding a diver-
sied portfolio. Thus, in this section, we assume the other extreme: agents hold
only one type of debt6. One motivation for this behavior is that government bonds
might be traded in large \chunks", and that diversication requires the services of
a costly intermediary such as a mutual fund or a bank. Since agents are indierent
between holding only debt denominated in the local currency or only holding debt
denominated in the foreign currency or holding some mixture of both in the absence
of a cost to diversication, a small cost for holding a mixture will lead agents to only
choose one of the two extremes.
By assumption then, a fraction  of the savers will only hold bonds denominated
in the home currency, si;d = si and a fraction (1−) will only hold bonds denominated
in the foreign currency, si;d = 0. For simplicity of notation, let




be the net gain for agent i per unit increase in the return. This normalized net gain is
positive, if the long term savings exceed the agents share in the long term tax burden,
and negative otherwise.
One can identify three groups of agents. We concentrate their description on the
case, where savings and tax payments are nonnegative in order to economize on space:
1. Agents, who only hold domestically denominated bonds and whose savings ex-
ceeds their share of the tax burden, xi > 0. These agents will favor the action
to be taken by the government.
2. Agents, who only hold domestically denominated bonds and whose savings fall
short of their share of the tax burden, xi < 0. These agents will be against the
action to be taken by the government.
3. Agents, who only hold foreign currency denominated bonds. These agents will
always be against the action to be taken by the government.
Raising the average maturity of the debt  now has two eects:
1. The creditor eect:Ar a i s ei nmakes some agents move from the third to
the rst group, because one needs more agents holding the debt denominated in
the domestic currency. This raises the support for the membership enhancing
action.
6In fact, this is not even the most extreme possibility. Since short sales have not been ruled out
in this economy, agents could hold negative amounts of some type of debt.
152. The tax eect: Ar a i s ei nmakes some agents move from the rst to the
second group, because the overall tax burden rises with rising .T h i s l o w e r s
the support for the membership enhancing action. This lowers the support for
the membership enhancing action.
3. A decomposition eect: Ar a i s ei nmakes some agents move from the
third to the second group, because one needs more agents holding the debt
denominated in the domestic currency. This has no eect on the popular support
for the membership enhancing action.
The overall result depends on which one of the rst two eect dominates. Some
examples might help to illustrate this.
9.1 The case of a representative agent.
Suppose that agents are representative in the sense of all receiving the same income
yi  y and all agents wanting to save the same amount si  s. The only dierence
between agents is which type of debt they acquire, which we might think of being
determined by a lottery. For an agent acquiring the debt denominated in the domestic
currency, we have
xi = s − 
b
 
y =( 1− ) s>0
and hence, there are no agents in the second group. The tax eect is completely
absent. Thus, in this case, raising  raises the popular support for the membership
enhancing action because of the creditor eect.
9.2 The case of bond holders versus tax payers.
Suppose as considered further above already, that agents are either savers, si > 0a n d
( y i) = 0, or tax payers, si =0a n d( y i)>0. Again, the tax eect is completely
absent, because savers are completely unconcerned about the rising tax burden: no
agent can move from the rst into the second group. Thus again, raising  raises the
popular support for the membership enhancing action because of the creditor eect.
This insight seems to contradict somewhat the result obtained above, that  has no
eect, if there are only savers or tax payers. Above, however, we have assumed that
all savers save strictly positive amounts in the bonds denominated in the domestic
currency. The case considered here is at the boundary considered of the situation
above.
9 . 3 T h ec a s eo fi n d i  e r e n tv o t e r s .
Suppose nally, that there is a positive fraction of agents who hold debt denoted in
the domestic currency and who receive as much as they have to pay at some  , i.e.
16for which
si =  
b
 
 (yi) > 0.
Then, moving from some  =   −  just below   to some  =   + just above   will
make these agents switch from group one to group two, i.e. from supporters of the
action to opposers, no matter how small the movement 2 of the share parameter 
is. While some fraction of the agents will also switch from group 3 to group 1 because
of the increase in debt denominated in the home currency, that fraction is bounded
above by 2 and can thus be made arbitrarily small. In other words, as  ! 0, one
obtains a pure tax eect, eroding the support for the membership enhancing action.
10 Other benets and burdens of a monetary union:
zi 6=0 ;γ i6=0 .
Examining the results above, one notices that the absence of other benets and bur-
dens of a monetary union was crucial. For example for the intuition of our benchmark
result 2 of no eect of  on the popular support for the membership enhancing action,
we have argued that size of the net gain or net loss may change with , but not its
sign. If there are other benets and burdens of the monetary union and of taken the
action, however, the size of the redistributional eect matters too, since it will be
compared to zi and γi by voters.
A perhaps particularly plausible case is examined in the next proposition. To
formulate that proposition, we dene the exogenous net gain from taking the mem-
bership enhancing action to be
i =( p 1−p 0) z i−γ i
Note, that equation (2) can be rewritten as










We observe, that there is no formal dierence between the gain zi from joining the
union, weighted with the probability increase resulting from the action (p1 −p0), and
the negative of the pain of taking that action, −γi.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the exogenous net gains are strictly positive for every
member of the population, i > 0. Suppose, that everybody splits his bond portfolio
exactly in the same way, si;d = si. Then, as  moves from 0 to 1, support for the
membership enhancing action falls monotonically.
In words, if you seek political support for actions enhancing your chances at mem-
bership in the monetary union, if voters are otherwise positively inclined towards it,
17and if voters hold balanced portfolios, then do not issue long-term bonds denominated
in the home currency.
Proof: Let i; be the value for i at a particular value for .A t =0 ,t h e
vote is purely inﬂuenced by the other benet i > 0, see equation (3). Hence, the
entire population will favor a monetary union at  =0 . Furthermore, since si;d = si,






and it falls, if one has \<" instead. If i; rises with , the voter will not change his
or her attitude towards the action. This will be the case, for example, if the voter is
a pure saver si > 0;(y i)=0or a transfer receiver, (yi) < 0. However, if i; falls
with , then the voter might change his mind. Thus, as  increases from 0 to 1,t h e
fraction of agents who would rather oppose the action, can only increase. 
11 Debt sales to foreigners.
Of course, countriessell their debt not only to their own citizens, but also to foreigners,
i.e. agents who cannot participate in the vote by law. Should the government try to
sell domestically-denominated debt or should it try to sell foreign-denominated debt
to foreigners? This question is easy to answer. Proceeding through the analysis in
section 4, one can see that the case of bond sales to risk-neutral foreigners can easily
be included by interpreting b to be the total amount of debt issued, not just the debt
issued to its own citizens, and interpret  to be fraction of the total debt which is
denominated in the home currency, regardless of whether it is sold to domestic agents
or not. As a result, the market clearing condition for debt will change: write it as
b = bd + bf + b

with the additional term b denoting debt sales to foreigners, and bd , bf having
the same interpretation as before, i.e. domestically denominated debt and foreign
denominated debt, sold to domestic citizens. However, this change in the market
clearing condition does not change the analysis in section 4. In particular, we still
obtain equation (2), determining i, and thus the preferences for or against the
membership-enhancing action. Note now, that  can be changed ceteris paribus, i.e.
leaving si;d constant, by simply changing the decomposition of debt sold to foreigners.
We get the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose, that all agents have to pay nonnegative taxes, (yi),a n d
suppose that the total long-term debt is positive, b>0 . Then, holding the decom-
position of domestically sold debt constant, the political support for the membership
18enhancing action will be the lower, the more of the debt sold to foreigners is denomi-
nated in the domestic currency, i.e. the higher  is chosen.
Proof: This is a trivial consequence of (2): the more of the debt sold to foreign-
ers is denominated in the foreign currency, the smaller is , leaving everything else
constant, and thus, the larger the support. 
So, a country which wants to enhance its chances at membership should try to
avoid selling domestically denominated debt to foreigners. In fact, if possible, the
country might want to go short on domestically denominated debt sold to foreigners,
essentially buying insurance against the event of monetary unication from foreigners.
12 Risk aversion
So far, we have only considered risk-neutral agents. How do the results change, if risk-
aversion is assumed? Thus, suppose, that agents receive utility vi(c)f r o mc o n s u m i n g
c ,w h e r ev i (  ) is twice dierentiable, strictly concave, and dened on the whole real
line7. The agent supports the membership enhancing action, if
ui; ~ R;1 = E
h
vi(ci)jaction taken, ~ R
i
− γi >u i; ~ R;0 = E
h
vi(ci)jaction not taken, ~ R
i
:
In specifying this utility function, one should pause for a moment and think, which
terms one should include in the utility function v() and which ones one shouldn't.
Two alternative specications come to mind. The rst is, that ci should also include
−γi, the costs from taking the membership enhancing action. It turns out, that the
further analysis goes through just the same, when this is done. The second possibility
is, not to include the other benets from monetary union zi. As it turns out, this
does make a dierence, and we get back to that below.
Note that with debt of both types (and certainty about the action a), there are
complete markets. There are two contingencies, joining or not joining, and the ratio
of marginal utilities in these two contingencies will be equalized across all agents.
Consumption conditional on either contingency can be assigned a state-contingent
price.
There are two \extreme" possibilities to consider. The rst possibility is one of an
open economy, in which world nancial markets are large compared to the country at
hand. The second possibility is that of a closed economy, in which there is no asset
trade with foreigners. We analyze both cases in turn.
7If the utility function is only dened for positive consumption, we need to make additional
assumptions about si, yi and (yi), which make sure that agents cannot go bankrupt, or introduce
additional features to deal with bankruptcy. Since these seem to be unnecessary complications for
the purpose of the analysis at hand, we have made the simpler assumption, that the utility function
is dened everywhere
1912.1 Open nancial markets.
A reasonable assumption to make may be to imbed the country in an open world of
nancial markets, i.e. that
b = bd + bf + b
with the additional term b denoting debt sales to foreigners. Furthermore, it may
be reasonable to assume that the consequences of these contingencies are \small",
compared to world nancial markets, i.e. that foreigners are eectively risk neutral
with respect to the risk of joining or not joining. In that case, the state-contingent
prices are equal and foreigners will provide domestic agents with monetary unication
insurance, if necessary. Furthermore, domestic agents will choose their portfolios so
as to equalize consumption in both states,
ci;m = ci;n
We get the following proposition, which is, however, a bit less trivial than it may
seem.
Proposition 5 With risk neutral foreigners and open nancial markets, and with
strictly positive costs of taken the action, γi > 0, all agents will always oppose the
membership enhancing action, regardless of the split of debt by its government.
Proof: This proposition may look trivial, because after all the consumption will
be equalized across the two states, i.e. because vi(ci) will be the same, regardless
of whether the action will be taken or not, and taking the action costs additional
disutility −γi.
But one may want to do this argument a bit more carefully. What is crucial here
is that the ex post realized real returns on the bond denominated in the domestic
currency as well as the tax payments only depend on the on-the-equilibrium path ac-
tion taken as well as the realization or absence thereof of monetary unication. These
returns do not change, if the voters suddenly have a change of heart, given some mar-
ket nominal return, and decide to take some other, \surprising" action instead. To
understand this clearly, it is helpful to go follow again the \counterfactual" analysis
of section 4, possibly modied for the case at hand. Given the on-the-equilibrium
action a, nd the nominal return on debt denominated in the domestic currency ~ Ra
as before. Calculate the tax factor  = x,w h e r ex2f m;ng denotes whether the
country will join the monetary union or not. Given these, determine the asset hold-
ings si;d and si;f of all agents. They are now uniquely determined due to the strict
concavity of u(), or, put dierently, because consumption is equalized in both states.
Given these asset holdings, the to-be-realized returns Rx, and the tax factors x,
x 2f m;ng, consumption ci;x in the two contingencies is now determined, regardless
of whether the action is nally taken or not. By construction, ci;m = ci;n and hence,
given all the on-the-equilibrium path data, the agent will get the same utility of con-
sumption v(c), regardless of whether the action is nally taken or not and regardless
20of whether monetary unication happens or not. Thus, the agent will always favor,
not to take it. 
One may also think that this proposition is obvious, since the debt position of
domestic agents is independent of the debt management of its government: any dis-
crepancy is taken up by the foreigners. However, this is just one side of the story: if
the government issues more domestically denominated debt, it will increase the tax
burden on its citizens in case of a monetary union. The key element is now, that the
risk in this tax is insured away by domestic agents.
What is perhaps surprising about this proposition, that the agents may end up
opposing the membership enhancing action, even if the benets from joining the
monetary union zi are hugely positive. The reason for this result is, that the agent
eectively \sells" his claim to the additional unication consumption zi on foreign
markets. After that sale, the agent is simply indierent as to whether monetary
unication will take place or not, and all he sees now are the costs of taking the
action.
The result does rest on specifying the benets zi of joining the union to be part of




ci;m = ~ Rsi;d + Rfsi;f + yi − m (yi); if membership
ci;n =(~ R− ) s i;d + Rfsi;f + yi − n (yi); if no membership
and then to have the agent support the membership enhancing action, if
ui; ~ R;1 = E
h
vi(ci)+z ij action taken, ~ R
i
−γi >u i; ~ R;0 = E
h
vi(ci)+z ij action not taken, ~ R
i
:
To state the next proposition, recall
i =( p 1−p 0) z i−γ i
Proposition 6 With risk neutral foreigners and open nancial markets, agent i will
always oppose the membership enhancing action, if i < 0 and always favor it, if
i > 0, independent of the government debt split.
Proof: The proof proceeds exactly as above, except that now the consumption ci
is equalized across the two states of joining or not joining, and that now the dierence
between ui; ~ R;1 and ui; ~ R;0 is given by i,n o t− γ i.
2112.2 Closed nancial markets.
We nally consider the case, where the country is closed, i.e. where all the government
debt is held by its own citizens, and where there is no access to insurance from
foreigners, but where the governmentsells foreign-denominated debt (or indexeddebt)
to its own citizens. Despite the fact that nancial markets work quite well across
borders in practice, it is still true that citizens seem to prefer national assets. This is
the well-known Feldstein-Horioka (1980) puzzle: see Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991)
for a modern update. So the case we are considering here may be considered to be
fairly reasonable, too.
To simplify the analysis somewhat, we restrict ourselves to the case where every-
body earns the same income yi  y, the same savings si  s and has the same strictly
concave utility in consumption, v(). Also, we assume the second utility specication
above, i.e.
ui; ~ R;a = E
h






ci;m = ~ Rsi;d + Rfsi;f + y − m (y); if membership
ci;n =(~ R− ) s i;d + Rfsi;f + y − n (y); if no membership
Since agents are all alike in their consumption ci, they will all hold the same portfolio.
Since we have assumed a closed economy, we must thus have si;d = s and si;f =
(1 − )s. While consumption ci  c will be the same for all agents, it will generally
be dierent, depending on whether the country joins the monetary union or not.
Suppose, one were told the equilibrium values cm;a; and cn;a; for these two cases,
where we have noted the possible dependencies on whether the action is taken a 2
f0;1g and the split  as well. The standard Lucas asset pricing relationship delivers
(pav0(cm;a;)+( 1−p a) v 0( c n;a;))Rf = pav0(cm;a;) ~ Ra; +( 1−p a) v 0( c n;a;)( ~ Ra; − )
or, written dierently,




pav0(cm;a;)+( 1−p a) v 0( c n;a;)
(5)
is the equivalent riskneutral probability known from the nance literature, see e.g.
Due (1992). That probability will certainly depend also on  in general: we have
thus noted that dependency.
Similar to section 4, the nominal return thus satises ~ Ra; = Rf +( 1−^ p a;).
Depending on whether or not the action is taken in equilibrium (a 2f 0;1g)a n d
whether or not monetary union takes place or not (x 2f m ;n g ), one obtains the ex
22post realized real returns on domestically denominated debt ~ Ra; −1fx=mg and thus
the tax factor




Plugging all this back into the equations above for the consumptions ci;m  cm;a; and
cn;a;, one thus obtains a xed point problem in all these quantities, given  and a.
One can reduce this all to a one-dimensional xed point problem in the nominal return
~ Ra;:i f~ R a; is known, one can easily see from the equations above, that all other
quantities can be determined as well. One needs to check existence and uniqueness
of this xed point.
Given a xed point, calculate the expected utility
ui; ~ Ra;;^ a = p^ a (v(cm;a;)+z i)+( 1−p ^ a) v( c n;a;)+γ i1 f^ a =1g
from taking action ^ a at that point, and calculate the dierence between the expected
utility from taking action 1 versus taking action 0,
i;a; = ui; ~ Ra;;1 − ui; ~ Ra;;0
=( p 1 − p 0 )(v(c m;a;) − v(cn;a;)+z i)−γ i
In contrast to the situation of risk-neutrality, however, this dierence now depends
on the action a taken in equilibrium. A general existence result like theorem 1 and
statements about the eect of changes in  seems hard to come by, and we leave
matters at this point.
13 Some facts.
Let us examine the consequences of the theory for the case of Italy at the beginning of
1996, providing a particularly interesting example. At the beginning of 1996, it was
still unclear, whether Italy will join the monetary union or not, despite the apparent
impossibility of being able to satisfy the Maastricht criteria. The Italian government
made repeated eorts to prove that they should be allowed in, and some of these
eorts looked quite painful in terms of their short-term consequences for part of the
Italian public. Given the frequent elections in Italy, public support for such measures
must have been essential.
What are the features of Italian debt up to that point in time8?F i r s t ,t h ey i e l d
dierential between medium-to-long term Italian versus German debt should be ex-
amined, see gure 2. As one can see, the dierential never fell below three percent
before the beginning of 1996, and stood at ve percent at the beginning of 1996.
8Again, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Luigi Spaventa, who provided me with
most of the data used in this section


















Figure 2: Yield dierential between Italian and German medium- to long-term gov-
ernment bonds. Source: DataStream, series ITLNGYLD and BDLNGYLD.
The dierential fell drastically in 1996 to less than two percent. It is plausible that
this fall was caused by a rather dramatic reassessment of Italys chances to join the
monetary union by the nancial markets, see our equation 1. Other factors may have
played a role like e.g. a reassessment of the default risk or a general change in the long
term monetary policy in Italy even in the absence of monetary union. Disentangling
these issues requires a much deeper analysis than we want to pursue for the purpose
of the discussion here: the reader is instead advised to consult the paper by Favero,
Giavazzi and Spaventa (1996). For our purposes here, it shall suce that we can
think of the major part of the yield dierential as a dierential which will be erased
upon monetary union.
The decomposition of Italys public debt is shown in table 1 as well as gure 3. As
can be seen, there has been a slight upward trend in the medium-to-long term debt,
which becomes even stronger, once focussing on the xed rate part of that debt.
To check the average residual life of the xed rate medium to long term debt,
check the last line of table 1 as well as tables 2 and gures 4 and 5. As one can see,
xed rate debt still had on average ve years to maturity at the beginning of 1996. If
monetary union happens on schedule at the rst of January 1999, this debt will still
have two years to maturity on average. As one can see from gure 5, this average
residual life has been generally trending upwards since the beginning of the decade.
Finally, we are interested in the ownership structure of the Italian debt. They
can be learned from gure 6 for essentially long-term debt as well as from gure 7 for
all Italian debt. Interestingly, the ownership of long-term xed rate Italian debt by
24Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Medium to long Term 46.0 47.0 49.3 48.2 51.5 54.1 54.8
In foreign currency 3.0 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.6 4.7 5.4
All other 51.0 49.3 47.0 47.9 43.9 41.2 39.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Decomposing medium to long term: 1993 1994 1995
Fixed coupon (BTP) 22.9 28.1 31.2
+ Floating rate (CCT), indexed to BOT (T-Bills) 28.6 26.0 23.6
= Total medium term: 51.5 54.1 54.8
Data: Centro Eur. Rich. Date: 3/90 5/92 5/93 3/94 12/95
Fixed coupon (BTP) 22.0 29.0 29.0 35.0 38.0
(Av. life to maturity:) (2.31) (4.44) (4.08) (5.13) (4.4)
Table 1: This table shows the decomposition of Italian public debt in percent of the
total as well as the decomposition of medium to long term debt into xed coupon debt
and ﬂoating rate debt, Source: Bank of Italy, Italian Treasury. Data is taken at
the end of the year. Figure 3 contains a graphical representation of these numbers.
Additionally, the fraction of long term xed rate (BTP) debt according to the Centro
Europa Richerche is shown together with the average life to maturity. The dierences
to the Treasury numbers come about due to dierences in the denition of public debt.
Type of debt BOT CCT BTP Total
Date (T-Bills) (Floating) (Fixed) Average
Dec. 93 0.42 3.35 5.00 3.26
Mar. 94 0.44 3.28 5.46 3.47
June 94 0.41 3.13 5.49 3.44
Sep. 94 0.41 3.03 5.59 3.38
Dec. 94 0.42 2.96 5.47 4.69
Mar. 95 0.43 3.07 5.35 4.72
June 95 0.40 3.18 5.10 4.62
Sep. 95 0.40 3.27 4.87 4.57
Dec. 95 0.40 3.42 4.69 4.53
Mar. 96 0.42 3.51 4.96 4.63
Table 2: This table shows the average residual life of various debt instruments in years.
For the analysis here, the average residual life of BTP, i.e. medium-to-long term xed
coupon debt, is of particular interest. Source: The Italian Treasury. Figure 4 contains
a graphical representation of these numbers.
































Figure 3: Decomposition of public debt. For 1993 to 1995, the medium-to-long term
debt is further split into xed coupon debt (BTP) versus ﬂoating rate debt (CCT). In
the gure, the lines denoted \medium to long term", \foreign currency," and \other"
sum to 100 percent. The lines denoted \ﬂoating (CCT)" and \Fixed (BTP)" sum to
the value of \medium to long term". Additionally, the line \Fixed (BTP), CER" has
been drawn, which shows the fraction of debt in form of medium to long term xed
rate debt, as calculated by the Centro Europa Richerche, which, in principle, is the
same as the line called \Fixed (BTP)", but the calculations are done dierently. The
end of the year (mid December) dates have been chosen for the purpose of plotting.
See also table 1.



















Figure 4: Average residual life of various debt instruments, see also table 2.
















Figure 5: Average residual life of xed rate medium to long term debt (BTP) according
to the Centro Europa Richerche, see also table 1.
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Figure 6: Ownership structure for Italian debt, excluding BOT (T-bills) and CCT
(ﬂoating rate). The remainder is mainly long-term xed rate debt (data for strictly
long-term xed rate debt was unfortunately not available). Note the drastic decline in
ownership by private households. The years are to be interpreted as \points" in this
gure. Source: Centro Europa Richerche.
households has declined dramatically in the last decade. At the beginning of 1996, it
is actually fairly evenly distributed across the four groups shown in these gures.
Thus, for 1996, one may summarize these observations in light of the theory as
follows. There has been a shift towards long term xed rate debt in the nancing of
the government. The shift has been twofold: a higher fraction of the debt has been
nanced this way, and its maturity has increased. However, the majority of this debt
is not hold by Italian households: in fact, currently about a quarter of this debt is
held by foreigners. This makes it likely that we are in the situation of proposition 4:
the Italian debt policy may have actually contributed towards eroding the popular
support for a monetary union.
14 Discussion and conclusion.
We have investigated, whether a country can use its debt management strategically
in order to inﬂuence voter preferences regarding an action, which enhance the chances
of lower future inﬂation. A particularly relevant case of this situation is the current
situation in Europe as it is inching closer to monetary union. The point of this
analysis is, that domestically denominated debt presents holders of that debt with a
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Figure 7: Ownership structure for all Italian debt. Note the decline in ownership by
private households is not nearly as drastic as for just the long-term debt in gure 6,
indicating a shift in household ownership from long-term to short-term or ﬂoating rate
securities. The years are to be interpreted as \points" in this gure. Source: Centro
Europa Richerche.
29windfall gain in case of a lower inﬂation, making them tend to favor the action, but
which needs to be paid for by tax payers, which will thus tend to oppose the action.
The rather simple structure leads to a wealth of results, depending on the par-
ticular specications chosen. So, what should one make out of all of that? The key
lesson that may be learned here, is that the issue of windfall gains to debt holders
from a monetary union, and the corresponding, additional tax burden imposed on
the tax payers should attract sucient attention, and does require careful thinking.
The favorite result of the author are the results emerging from propositions 3 and
4 as well as from the facts about the Italian case shown in section 13: if politicians
seek to exploit the eects stated in this paper in order to gain political support for
measures enhancing their countries chances at joining the monetary union, then it is
a bad idea to issue long term debt denominated in the home currency as opposed to
issuing long term debt denominated in a foreign currency such as the Dollar. Thus,
recentItalian debt management policy may have actually contributedtowards eroding
the popular support for a monetary union.
As a caveat, one should keep in mind that there are other results to the contrary
in this paper. Perhaps, the main conclusion that should emerge is that the issue
of redistribution due from tax payers to holders of long term bonds in the case of
a reduction of inﬂation as induced by, say, a monetary union, is something that is
not trivial in magnitude and requires careful attention with respect to measuring the
incidence of the inﬂation tax and the bond holder windfall gains.
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